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Abstract
This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key
determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of
the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberaliza-
tion, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it attempts
to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual
deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. This simultaneous inves-
tigation is conducted by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999
time-series-cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Sectoral as
well as institutional and financial factors are found to be important determi-
nants of the actual reforms implemented. We uncover a positive relationship
between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment
and the growth of the fixed-line segment, suggesting that these two segments
have benefited from each other. We also find that countries facing increas-
ing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce
competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line in-
cumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors and
governments. In turn, these policies are those that enhance the deployment
of fixed-line infrastructure. In contrast, competition in the analogue cellular
segment and the creation of a separate regulator seem to be relatively less
attractive policies as they are found to be less likely to be introduced in coun-
tries facing increasing institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact
on fixed network deployment is found to be negative or non significant.
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1 Introduction
The telecommunications sector has been at the forefront of the wave of re-
forms that has profoundly reshaped infrastructure industries worldwide by
allowing new market configurations and institutions to emerge. Both devel-
oped and developing countries have been concerned with enhancing industry
suppliers’ performance. Competition in some segments of the industry has
been introduced, sometimes with some level of privatization of state-owned
incumbents, and the legal and regulatory framework has been (re)designed
with the purpose of enhancing diversification and quality of service, efficiency,
and tariffs. One must recognize, however, that policy makers in developing
countries faced a far more challenging task than their developed countries
counterparts. Poor infrastructures, weak economic conditions, and inade-
quate institutions inherited from the pre-reforms era are all but some of the
significant impediments to the advancement of the reforms they had to over-
come. Given the scarcity of resources, the question then is how to efficiently
allocate these resources among the many objectives.
In a previous econometric study (Gasmi et al, 2006), we have shown
that political accountability is an important determinant of regulatory per-
formance and forcefully argued that policies aimed at enhancing politically
accountable systems should be given due attention in development programs.
In this paper, we further investigate the relationship between the reforms of
the telecommunications sector that have been actually implemented in de-
veloping countries and the evolution of this sector. More specifically, we ap-
proach this issue by attempting to both evaluate the impact of the sectoral
reforms on the deployment of infrastructure and identify the main factors
that lead to specific reforms and allowed them to proliferate.
In addition to insufficient deployment of telecommunications technolo-
gies and lack of good institutional governance, developing countries are often
characterized by poor macroeconomic conditions. The structuration of the
reforms in terms of their number, their design, and their timing, as well as
their effective impact on the industry performance, are all subject to these
constraints. Hence, market outcomes resulting from the telecommunications
reforms are not only conditioned by decisions pertaining to the sector it-
self, but also by the institutional and macroeconomic environment. Factors
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such as corruption engrained in the political system and lack of democracy
substantially weakens the efficiency of institutional rules whereas high debt
service and inefficient taxation worsen the financial situation.
While the question of the impact of telecommunications reforms on the
deployment of infrastructure in developing countries has been fairly well ad-
dressed from an empirical standpoint, the issue of the determinants of these
reforms has been mainly examined at a conceptual level.2 This paper seeks to
fill this void by tackling these two issues within a unified empirical framework.
Using data on the telecommunications industry in developing countries, we
attempt to evaluate the impact of the reforms on network expansion and,
at the same time, investigate the role that infrastructure deployment, in-
stitutional risk, and access to public funds have played in the decisions to
introduce competition, to privatize the state-owned incumbent operator, and
to create a separate regulatory authority. The link between sectoral reforms
and infrastructure deployment variables is explored by means of a systematic
investigation of two-way causal relationships between these variables.
Our search for a two-way causality between reform and network expan-
sion variables also gives us an indication of the extent to which the econo-
metric estimation of our regressions would need to account for endogeneity
of some of the regressors. Indeed, one might expect that reform policies such
as the introduction of competition and privatization may be endogenous to
infrastructure deployment, particularly in the early stages of the reforms as
licences are often granted conditional on the fulfillment of service penetration
and quality targets.3 Moreover, the creation of a separate regulatory entity
may also depend on pre-regulatory conditions.
In this paper, we depart from the approach typically followed in the lit-
erature to analyze the telecommunications reforms in developing countries
by treating separately the analogue and digital segments of the cellular mar-
ket as far as the introduction of competition is concerned. This allows us
therefore to shed some light on the market implications of technology and
history.
2Fink et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive overview of the empirical stream of the
literature. Contributions to the conceptual stream include Auriol and Picard (2004),
Emerson (2006), Evans et al. (2005), Laffont (2005), and Warlters (2004).
3Often licences are also associated with exclusivity periods.
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The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section summarizes some
of the main results recently put forward in the empirical literature on the
determinants of the telecommunications reforms and their impact on infras-
tructure deployment as measured by fixed-line service penetration. Section
3 describes the data set used in this paper which contains information on
the telecommunications industry in 86 developing countries during the pe-
riod 1985-1999. Section 4 describes the basic econometric ingredients used
in our empirical analysis. The results of our empirical investigation of the
determinants of the telecommunications reforms and their impact on infras-
tructure deployment are discussed in section 5. This section also discusses
some (testable) theoretical hypotheses drawn from the literature on the de-
terminants of reforms on which our analysis brings some empirical evidence.
Section 6 summarizes our findings, discusses some policy implications, and
points to some directions for further research. A detailed description of the
data used, their sources, and some complementary material are given in the
appendix.
2 Related literature
Thanks to the availability of data on the telecommunications industry accu-
mulated over two decades now, there is a relatively large empirical literature
that analyzes the impact of major reforms on infrastructure deployment in
this sector. The empirical literature exploring the determinants of these
sectoral reforms, however, is at its infancy and mostly deals with political
factors. We briefly review some representative studies in each of these two
streams of the literature and indicate all along some points of this literature
that our paper contributes to.
Most of the studies done so far on the impact of sectoral reforms on in-
frastructure deployment in developing countries acknowledge the fact that,
overall, there exists a robust relationship between variables representing the
reforms and variables measuring telecommunications network expansion such
as fixed-line service penetration. In particular, the bulk of this literature has
come to the conclusion that the introduction of competition has resulted in
measurable network deployment and labor efficiency in the fixed-line seg-
4
ment. Fink et al. (2002) provide an analysis of the impact of competition on
fixed-line deployment and labor efficiency in data on 86 developing countries
across African, Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and Caribbean coun-
tries for the period 1985-1999. Wallsten (2001), Gutierrez (2003), and Ros
(2003) use data on a set of African and Latin American countries while Ros
(1999) uses data on countries with GDP per capita of less than USD 10,000
and McNary (2001) and Li and Xu (2004) use worldwide data. Though
McNary (2001), Fink et al. (2002), and Li and Xu (2004) consider the intro-
duction of competition in the fixed-line and cellular segments, to the best of
our knowledge, the analogue and digital segments have yet to be addressed
separately. This paper is an attempt to do so.
There is not such a consensus on the impact of the privatization of the
fixed-line incumbent on network expansion. Some empirical results indi-
cate that this policy has a positive impact on fixed-line deployment. After
controlling for tariff re-balancing, Banerjee and Ros (2000) find that priva-
tization reduces unmet demand by approximately 28% in a data set on 23
Latin American countries for the period 1986-1995. Gutierrez (2003) reports
a reduction of unmet demand of the order of 10 to 18% in data on 22 Latin
American countries covering the period 1980-1997. Similar results are ob-
tained by Fink et al. (2002), Ros (2003), and Li and Xu (2004) using various
data sets.
Other empirical studies using worldwide data sets, in particular, Ros
(1999) and McNary (2001), indicate that privatization has no or even a neg-
ative impact on fixed-line deployment.4 Nevertheless, both authors insist
on the role played by independent regulators in the privatization process, a
feature that neither of them includes in their investigations. The importance
of this issue is highlighted by Wallsten (2001) and Gutierrez (2003) who find
that privatization coupled with the existence of an independent regulator
results in larger gains in terms of network expansion. Fink et al. (2002)
and Ros (2003) also find that the impact of privatization and competition
reforms is enhanced by the creation of a separate regulator. As to the impact
of privatization on efficiency, it is found that it is similarly affected by the
4For an analysis of privatization policies across the world see Bortolotti and Siniscalco
(2004).
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presence of an independent regulator (Wallsten, 2001, Gutierrez, 2003).5
There is an emerging yet limited empirical literature focusing on the deter-
minants of sectoral reforms in infrastructure industries and this literature has
been so far mainly concerned with political factors. Using telecommunica-
tions data for the period 1990-1998 on a panel of countries chosen worldwide,
Li and Xu (2002) and Li et al. (2005) explore the political economy of liber-
alization, privatization, and regulatory reforms.6 In both studies, countries
with stronger pro-reform interest groups, namely, financial actors and urban
consumers, are more likely to implement reforms in more democratic environ-
ments. Li and Xu (2002) find that less democratic countries are more likely
to maintain the public sector monopoly when the fiscal deficit is high. In
addition, Li et al. (2005) find that reforms are less likely to be implemented
in countries where incumbent operators have already sunk large investments
since these operators have strong incentives to oppose the reforms.
Closer to our work, Gual and Trillas (2006) are, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the first to consider both the determinants of the reforms, in particular,
to highlight the role of entry and regulatory policies, and the impact of the
reforms on network deployment. They use a Two-Stage-Least-Squares esti-
mation technique to fit 1998 cross-sectional data on 37 countries.7 Though
their results are not always robust, these authors find some preliminary ev-
idence that competition policies have a positive impact on network deploy-
ment and that regulatory independence has a negative effect on productivity.
With regard to the determinants of reforms, they find that countries with in-
5Some details of the private transactions are also found to play an important role
in network deployment. See Wallsten (2000) and Li and Xu (2004) for the effects of
exclusivity periods and Ros (2003) for the effects of the price cap regulatory regime.
6Liberalization reforms are measured by an index computed as the average of six indi-
cators describing the market environment (multiple-player environment, pro-competition
initiatives, and interconnection policy) in the fixed-line and cellular segments. Privatiza-
tion concerns the fixed-line incumbent while regulatory reforms account for tariff policies
and the degree of autonomy and transparency of regulation in the fixed-line and cellular
segments.
7Entry policies relate to investment conditions imposed on entrants, average number of
mobile providers, number portability, carrier selection, carrier pre-selection, and local loop
unbundling availability. Regulatory policies have to do with licensing, interconnection,
tariffs, scarce resources, universal service, the funding structure, the appointment process
of regulators, the length of the term, the reporting process, the year of establishment of
effective operation, and the incumbent capital ownership.
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terventionist traditions have fewer liberalization policies and that the larger
the size of the incumbent and the lower the protection of investors, the more
prone a country is to create an independent regulator.
We extent the work of Gual and Trillas (2006) in two ways. First, we
analyze in a more disaggregated manner the role of major policies that have
been used to reform the telecommunications sector. More specifically, we
attempt to estimate the effect of the level of competition in the digital and
analogue cellular segments, and in the local fixed-line segment, the effect of
the creation of a separate regulator, and the effect of privatization of the
fixed-line incumbent. Second, we provide an interpretation of some of our
results as tests of a series of hypotheses derived from the theoretical litera-
ture on telecommunications reform. These hypotheses are mostly concerned
with the institutional and financial endowments of a country that have been
emphasized in the literature as being important drivers of infrastructure in-
dustries reforms in developing countries. This approach allows us therefore
to evaluate the indirect impact, through the reforms selected by the govern-
ments, of these country-specific features on infrastructure deployment.
3 Data and main variables
We have constructed a time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data set contain-
ing time-varying information on 86 developing countries for the period 1985-
1999.8 These data have been organized in variables regrouped in five cate-
gories, namely, “Telecommunications deployment,” “Telecommunications re-
forms,” “Institutional environment and risk indices,” “Cost of public funds,”
and “Other variables and instruments.” The list of the countries included in
the data set, the designation of each of the variables, the data sources, and
some standard summary statistics are given in the appendix.
The deployment of telecommunications infrastructure is captured in a
8Selectivity bias should not be a concern in our data set. First, our panel includes
some countries that have reformed and some that haven’t. Second, firms do not appear
as having control over the regulatory regime under which they operate. On the one
hand, firms with poor performance may be subject to reforms. On the other hand, the
government may decide to reform well performing sectors that deliver high license fees.
For empirical evidence on such a positive relationship between firms’ performance and the
introduction of reforms, see, e.g., Ross (1999).
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variable that gives the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants that
connect the subscribers’ terminal equipment to the PSTN.9 Telecommuni-
cations reforms are represented by variables that give the number of com-
petitors in the analogue and digital cellular segments, variables that indicate
whether competition prevails in the fixed-line local segment and whether a
separate telecommunications regulator has been created, and a variable that
gives the % of the fixed-line incumbent’s assets sold to private investors. The
extent of competition in the analogue and digital cellular markets is captured
in a four-category variable that specifies the number of licences issued in these
segments, that is, no licence, one licence (monopoly), two licences (duopoly),
or more (high competition). As to the fixed-line market, we focus on compe-
tition in the local segment as this is the one that has historically constituted
a bottleneck.10 Moreover, we do not differentiate between a duopoly situa-
tion and a high competition situation in the fixed-line local segment since
there are very few countries in our data set that have actually attributed
more than two licenses to this segment.
The institutional environment indices indicate how corrupt the govern-
ment is and how strong its ability to commit to announced policy is. These
indices are constructed from variables measuring the degree of corruption,
the quality of the institutional framework, and the level of democracy in the
country.11 Corruption includes actual and potential influence of the polit-
ical system in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations,
favors for favors, secret party funding, and close ties between politicians
and businesses. The quality of the institutional framework is captured by a
variable that is calculated as the unweighted sum of variables reflecting gov-
ernment integrity, the efficiency of bureaucracy, the strength of courts and
their capacity to enforce decisions, and government commitment credibility,
in particular, the extent to which asset expropriation and contract repudi-
ation is used by the government. The level of democracy is captured in a
variable whose value is found by subtracting an index of autocracy from an
9Public Switched Telephone Network.
10Hence, we do not account for competition in the long distance or international seg-
ments.
11Laffont (2005) evokes the idea of corruption and democracy being negatively corre-
lated.
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index of democracy. The risk index is measured by a variable computed as
the average of three series corresponding to economic, financial, and institu-
tional risks. Higher values of these institutional environment and risk indices
reflect a “better” overall institutional environment and a lower risk.
The cost of public funds is captured in variables measuring the value of
debt service and net taxes on products as a proportion of respectively the
gross national income (GNI) and the gross domestic product (GDP) and aid
per capita, all expressed in 2000 USD.12 These variables are chosen because
of the relationships between them which can be explained as follows. For
a given tax system, increases in debt force the government to increase its
revenue requirement by borrowing more or by increasing taxation. Hence,
one can expect a positive relationship between debt and the cost of public
funds.13 Net taxes on products capture a type of commodity taxation which
has been introduced in recent years providing developing countries with a
more effective instrument for raising revenues than other indirect taxation
mechanisms such as taxes on profits. These relatively efficient taxes and aid
perceived by the government may have a direct impact on the government
funding requirements and can be expected to be negatively correlated with
the cost of public funds.14 Since it takes time for changes in debt or aid to
have an effect on the tax system and for taxes on products to be settled,
we use lagged values of these variables in the parameterization of the cost of
public funds.
Variables under the heading of “Other variables and instruments” are
those that measure other factors that are deemed relevant for our estimation
of the determinants and the impact of the reforms. The “variables” part
includes the population density, the % of the population that is rural, imports
as a proportion of GDP, full time fixed-line and mobile telecommunications
staff as a proportion of total population, and the number of checks and
12The cost of public funds is commonly viewed as the deadweight loss due to distor-
tionary taxation that the government has to rely on to collect these funds.
13We should note that here we are not making inferences about the variables in levels.
Indeed, a given level of the cost of public funds results from a complex interaction among
multiple tax instruments and as such it may coexist with different debt levels.
14This is a different argument than that of aid conditionality. For example, aid con-
ditionality may not be effective when the recipient country does not want to reform (see
Ghosh Banerjee and Rondinelli, 2003).
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balances in the political system. In addition to being an indicator of the
division of power in the political system, in as so far as it is informative
of the political stability of the country, the checks and balances variable
also captures the level of the (social) discount rate in the country. More
specifically, the higher the discount rate, i.e., the higher the valuation of the
future by agents, the higher the number of checks and balances indicating a
“better” mode of functioning of the political process.
The “instruments” part includes a set of variables reflecting various coun-
try specific features that might improve the explanatory power of the esti-
mated models. This set includes variables concerning some aspects related to
the origin (English or French) of the legal system, the importance of protes-
tants in the population (% in 1980), the country’s latitude (in absolute value),
the country’s level of literacy (average schooling years in the population over
25 in 1980), and the ethno-linguistic fractionalization of the country. It also
includes variables that specify whether the country belongs to Sub-Saharan
Africa, the importance of crop and forest land in the country (ratio to total
land), whether there are significant political obstacles to policy changes in
the country, the quality of the media’s legal environment, the degree of ten-
sion attributable to race, nationality, or language, and the strength of the
legal system and the public observance of the law.
4 Econometric methodology
To investigate the determinants of the telecommunications reforms and the
impact of these reforms on network expansion, we run a set of regressions
with the dependent variable representing either a reform policy or a measure
of infrastructure deployment. In the reform regressions, the explanatory vari-
ables have been chosen so as to allow us to test some hypotheses derived from
the recent theoretical literature on the determinants of the reforms. These
hypotheses, which are discussed in more details in the next section, are con-
cerned with the role played by corruption and the cost of public funds in the
decisions to introduce competition and to privatize state-owned incumbents,
and with the influence that the government’s ability to commit, the return on
investment, and the discount factor have on the decision to create a separate
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regulator. In the regressions that aim to explain infrastructure deployment,
the latter being measured by a variable of fixed-line network expansion, we
use, among other explanatory variables, indicators of the telecommunications
reforms.
Prior to specifying the regressions to be estimated, we perform some
tests for the existence of two-way causal relationships between the variables
representing telecommunications reforms and those representing fixed-line
network deployment.15 These tests, of the Granger-causality type developed
in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), allow us to obtain a set of potential explanatory
variables to be used in the specification of the regressions.16
For the estimation, we apply two different techniques according to the
nature of the dependent variable. For the regressions involving a discrete
dependent variable, we use the group duration methodology. This is the case
when the dependent variable is an indicator of competition in the analogue
or digital cellular segments, in the local fixed-line segment, or of the existence
of a separate regulator. For the regressions involving a continuous dependent
variable, we use the System Generalized Method of Moments (SYS-GMM).
This technique is used when the dependent variable represents the privati-
zation reform policy or the deployment of fixed-line network. Some basic
explanations of these two techniques are provided next.
4.1 Regressions with a discrete dependent variable
For the regressions in which the dependent variables that represent telecom-
munications reforms are discrete, we fit the data by applying a grouped
duration methodology developed in Beck et al. (1998) that allows us to
explore the presence of temporal dependence.17 This methodology consists
15These tests also shed some light on the issue of endogeneity of reforms to network
expansion, an issue that has been raised in the literature. See Ros (1999) and Gutierrez
(2003) on the endogeneity of competition in the local, long distance, and international
fixed-line service, and of the privatization of the incumbent operator. Endogeneity of
regulation is discussed in Gutierrez (2003) and Ros (2003).
16The reader is referred to Gasmi et al. (2006) for details on the implementation of
these tests.
17The presence of temporal dependence in TSCS discrete regressions results in a viola-
tion of the assumption of independent observations which leads to an underestimation of
their variability. In our context, the number of years elapsed between an event, e.g., the
issuing of a licence in the case of competition variables or the creation of the regulatory
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in using the complementary log-log (CLOGLOG) estimation technique with
the discrete dependent variables capturing the elapsed time until the reform
and with d temporal dummies, tempd, d = 1, 2, . . . , 14, capturing the time
since the most recent event.18 Since including the temporal dummies may
introduce multicollinearity, we first test if they are needed by means of a
likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the observations are temporally
independent, i.e., that tempd = 0 for all d.
An econometric issue which is particularly relevant in our modeling con-
text is that of the occurrence of multiple events in the series indicating com-
petition in the analogue and digital cellular segments. Omitting to explicitly
model multiple events amounts to assuming that first, second, and subse-
quent events are independently distributed. It is, however, unlikely that an
event such as the issuing of a licence is independent of the timing and the
number of licenses previously issued in the same segment. To model multi-
ple events, we include in the previous specification a variable, counter, that
counts at a given year the number of similar events that occurred in the
previous years.19
The discrete model is then specified as follows:
r∗it = φ+ x
′
itϕ+
T−1∑
d=1
tempd,it + counterit + ωit (1)
i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; rit =
{
1 if r∗it ≥ 0
0 if r∗it < 0
authority in the case of the variable that indicates the existence of a separate regulator,
and the start of the sample or the previous event seems likely to influence the results.
18The dependent variable takes on the value 1 in year t if one licence or more has been
issued sometime in year t, in the case of the competition variables, or if the regulatory
agency has been separated from and is not directly controlled by a ministry or a utility
sometime in year t, in the case of the variable indicating the existence of a separate
regulator, and 0 otherwise. The temporal dummies are created by first constructing a
variable marking the length of the sequence of zeros that precede the current observation
of the dependent variable.
19The counter variable takes on the value 0 in year t if no license has been issued in t−1
or earlier, 1 if one license has been issued in t − 1 or earlier, 2 if two licences have been
issued in t−1 or earlier, and 3 if three or more licenses have been issued in t−1 or earlier.
In practice, this variable is noted counter ana in the regression concerning competition in
the analogue cellular segment and counter dig in the one concerning competition in the
digital cellular segment.
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where the indices i and t refer to the country and the year respectively, r∗it is
the unobserved latent variable, rit is the dichotomous variable representing
the reform, φ is a scalar parameter, xit is the vector of regressors, ϕ is the
associated vector of parameters, and ωit is a disturbance term. The vector of
regressors xit includes the population density, the % of the population that
is rural, and some variables introduced for the purpose of testing a series
of hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature on the determinants of
reforms.20,21 For the data set used in the analysis N = 86, the number of
developing countries in the sample, and T = 15, the number of years of
observation (1985-1999).
Some of the regressors included in xit may in fact be endogenous, hence,
correlated with the disturbance term, which would lead to inconsistent esti-
mators.22 To circumvent this difficulty, we specify an additional equation for
each of the endogenous regressors and use the Full Information Maximum
Likelihood (FIML) estimation technique.23 More specifically, FIML is used
to estimate the simultaneous system composed of (1) and the equation
vit = ϑ+ w
′
itγ + z
′
itδ + ηit (2)
where vit is a component of the vector vit of (continuous) endogenous regres-
sors in xit, ϑ is a scalar parameter, wit is a vector of exogenous regressors in
xit, γ is the associated vector of parameters, zit is a vector of instruments, δ
is the associated vector of parameters, and ηit is a disturbance term.
20These hypotheses are stated in section 5.1.
21The vector of regressors xit is set in first differences in order to eliminate sources of
unobserved fixed heterogeneity.
22Endogeneity might stem from say competition having an effect on how corrupt the
government is (see Bliss and Di Tella, 1997, and Laffont and N’Guessan, 1999) or the
creation of a separate regulator affecting the level of network expansion and the size of
the telecommunications staff.
23Although FIML provides an exogeneity test, it becomes computationally unfeasible
as the number of regressors included as endogenous grows. We use then the Two Stage
Conditional Maximum Likelihood (2SCML) estimator derived by Rivers and Vuong (1988)
to perform exogeneity tests since it allows the presence of multiple potentially endogenous
regressors. See the appendix for more on 2SCML exogeneity tests.
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4.2 Regressions with a continuous dependent variable
We now briefly discuss the econometric methodology that we use to fit the
data when the dependent variable is continuous. This is the case when the
dependent variable represents the level of privatization of the incumbent or
the measure of fixed-line deployment, i.e., the fixed-service penetration rate.
Given the dynamic nature of our data, which has been confirmed by
Lagrange multiplier tests, we use the System Generalized Method of Moments
(SYS-GMM) developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) for analyzing panel
data and applied by Beck and Katz (2004) to TSCS data.24 However, these
authors show that, with a non stationary dependent variable, the dispersion
of the value of the coefficient in an autoregressive process of order one found
with different asymptotically equivalent methods often exceeds its standard
errors. Hence, for these accuracy reasons, we first investigate the stationarity
of our dependent variables. We find that these variables are stationary in
first differences and hence continue our analysis with these series transformed
in first differences.25
We specify the following dynamic autoregressive:
yit = α0 + α1yit−1 + x′itβ + µi + ²it (3)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N , t = 1, 2, . . . , T , yit is a one-dimensional variable rep-
resenting the continuous dependent variable (fixed-line deployment or priva-
tization level), α0 and α1 are scalar parameters, xit is a vector of regressors,
β is the associated vector of parameters, µi is a country-specific fixed factor,
and ²it is a disturbance term.
26 For the fixed-line deployment regression, the
vector of regressors xit includes the institutional and democracy indices, the
population density, and the % of the population that is rural. It also con-
tains the indicators of the telecommunications reforms. For the privatization
regression, this vector of regressors contains the two population variables
24As an instrumental variables (IV) estimation method, SYS-GMM privileges consis-
tency.
25Details on the stationarity tests can be found in Gasmi et al. (2006) and the results
obtained for this paper are available from the authors upon request.
26The standard assumptions E(µi) = 0, E(²it) = 0, E(²itµi) = 0, and E(yi1²it) = 0 are
made. The fixed-line deployment series is transformed in logs to minimize heteroskedas-
ticity and influential outliers problems and the vector of regressors xit is taken in first
differences to eliminate any sources of unobserved fixed heterogeneity.
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above and the variables that are used to test the hypotheses derived from
the theoretical literature on the determinants of reforms.
To take care of endogeneity problems which seem likely to arise in the
estimation of equation (3), we set a procedure to find appropriate instru-
ments.27 When exploiting the information in first differences associated with
this equation, we follow the standard approach that consists in taking lagged
variables in levels as a set of potential instruments and selecting appropriate
lag lengths by investigating whether the disturbance term is serially uncor-
related or follows a moving average process of some order q, MA(q). In the
case of a serially uncorrelated disturbance term, we have E(²it²is) = 0 for
t 6= s, and the variables y and x lagged two and more periods are valid in-
struments.28 If the disturbance term is a MA(1), we have E(²it²it−l) 6= 0 for
l ≤ 1 and E(²it²it−l) = 0 for l > 1, and the variables y and x lagged three
and more periods are valid instruments. More generally, if the disturbance
term follows a MA(q), the valid instruments are y and x lagged (2 + q) and
more periods.29 Following the same approach when exploiting the informa-
tion in levels related to equation (3), it is possible to use as instruments,
the variables {∆y,∆x} lagged one period when the disturbance is serially
uncorrelated, and lagged (q + 1) periods when it follows a MA(q).30
27Endogeneity is indeed an issue in our context. For example, one may argue that
privatization might be used to signal commitment towards policy reforms contributing to
the reduction of risk ratings. Moreover, privatization of public utilities may open the door
to more corruption (see Martimort and Straub, 2006).
28Indeed, it can be seen that for T ≥ 3, E(∆²it log(yit−t′)) = 0 and E(xit−t′∆²it) =
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; t = 3, . . . , T, t′ = 2, . . . , t− 1.
29In practice, we start by using as instruments for the equation in first differences the
variables log(y) and x lagged two and more periods. If the disturbance term in first
differences presents no second-order autocorrelation, we are facing a serially uncorrelated
disturbance term in levels which therefore says that the instruments used are valid. If the
disturbance term in first differences presents a second-order autocorrelation, this indicates
that, in levels, this term follows a moving average process and that the dependent variables
log(y) and x lagged two periods are endogenous and hence are not valid instruments. We
then repeat the procedure by using, as instruments for the equation in first differences,
the variables log(y) and x lagged n times (n ≥ 3) and more until we find no n-order
autocorrelation in the disturbance term in first differences.
30Indeed, it can be seen that E(∆ log(yit−1−q)(µi+²it)) = 0 and E(∆xit−1−q(µi+²it)) =
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; t = 3 + q, . . . , T .
15
5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we present the results of our analysis of the determinants of
the telecommunications reforms and their impact on fixed-line deployment.
First, we discuss the theoretical hypotheses on the determinants of the re-
forms that we will seek to test in our regressions. Second, we present the
results of a preliminary inspection of the data the purpose of which is to
search for empirical evidence of causal relationships between the telecommu-
nications reforms and fixed-line deployment variables. Third, we move on
to presenting the results of our regressions on the determinants of reforms
dependent variables of two types, discrete and continuous. Fourth, we syn-
thesize the empirical information contained in the results pertaining to the
simultaneous relationship between the reforms and the expansion of the fixed
network, one of the major objectives of the reforms. This involves first ex-
amining the impact of reforms on the fixed-line segment which we do in this
section. Finally, we summarize our findings on the determinant of reforms.
5.1 The determinants of reforms: Some testable
theoretical hypotheses
The literature on the factors that influence the decision to reform the telecom-
munications sector by introducing competition has emphasized the role of
corruption in the political system and the cost of public funds. Emerson
(2004) develops a model where rent seeking firms agree to pay bribes to
policy makers to limit market entry. One of the equilibria obtained is char-
acterized by low (high) levels of corruption combined with high (low) levels
of competition. Under the assumption that data reflect this equilibrium, a
testable hypothesis is then that
Hypothesis 1: Countries with relatively high corruption will tend to introduce
less competition.
Following a normative approach, Auriol and Picard (2004) develop a
model where it is optimal to foster competition in infrastructure industries
when the cost of public funds is low. In our context, this argument translates
into the hypothesis that
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Hypothesis 2: Countries with a relatively high cost of public funds will tend
to introduce less competition.
Turning to the reform which involves the creation of an independent reg-
ulator, the literature has pointed to the role of government commitment,
return on investment, and the discount factor. Drawing on a framework de-
veloped for analyzing the decision to create independent central banks, Evans
et al. (2005) claim that in infrastructure industries government commitment
and regulatory independence are substitutes. Moreover, these authors argue
that regulatory independence becomes more necessary to alleviate under-
investment when the return on investment and the discount factor are high.31
These arguments translate into the hypothesis that
Hypothesis 3: Countries with relatively low government commitment, large
returns on investment, and high discount factors will tend to create an inde-
pendent regulator.
Among the determinants of the privatization reform in infrastructure sec-
tors discussed in the literature and given the purpose of our study, we have
focused on the role of corruption of the political system and the cost of pub-
lic funds. Laffont (2005) develops a positive theory of privatization where,
for sufficiently low levels of corruption, as corruption increases the private
gains of politicians from privatization are larger than those obtained with a
public firm and dominate the social costs of privatization. However, for very
large levels of corruption, it is necessary to leave the control of the firm to
private shareholders, and in these circumstances, the private gains of politi-
cians cannot compensate for the rents appropriated by private investors. An
implication of this theory is then that within low (high) levels, increasing
corruption levels should influence positively (negatively) the decision to pri-
vatize. In our context, this implication translates into the hypothesis that
31Evans et al. (2005) show how delegating pricing decisions to a sufficiently pro-industry
regulator, i.e., whose preferences differ from those of the government, can alleviate the
under-investment problem in the absence of regulatory commitment. In addition, if in-
vestment in a regulated sector is crucial for the development of a country, it becomes then
necessary to provide a mechanism to alleviate under-investment. These authors also find
evidence that when agents attach a high value to the future due, for example, to polit-
ical stability or low interest rates, the welfare enhancing properties of the independent
regulator become more evident.
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Hypothesis 4: Countries with sufficiently small or high levels of corruption
will tend to privatize less.
Returning to the normative approach, Auriol and Picard (2004) find that
when the government does not fully capture the expected profit of the pri-
vatization transaction, privatization improves social welfare for intermediate
values of the cost of public funds, but state ownership is preferred for low
or high values. Since developing countries have typically medium to large
levels of the cost of public funds, the latter should negatively influence the
privatization decision.32 The implication then is that when public firms in
the infrastructure sector are sold at a discount because of a high country risk
rating, a government in need for cash should keep the profitable ones. We
translate these argument into the hypothesis that
Hypothesis 5: Countries with a relatively high cost of public funds and a high
risk will tend to privatize less.
5.2 Causality relationships
Table 1 below summarizes the results of the Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) causal-
ity testing procedure applied to the telecommunications reforms and fixed-
line deployment variables. More specifically, these tests allow us to conclude
on the existence of a causal relationship of a Granger type between the vari-
ables that represent competition in the analogue cellular segment, ac, com-
petition in the digital cellular segment, dc, competition in the fixed-line local
segment lc, the creation of a separate regulator, r, and privatization, p, on
the other hand, and the variable that proxies the fixed-line deployment, ml,
on the other hand.33
Table 1
Causal relationships
ac dc lc r p
reform → fixed-line deployment Yes Yes No Yes Yes
fixed-line deployment → reform No Yes Yes Yes No
32Using a normative approach, Warlters (2004) also finds that a decrease in the cost of
public funds may induce infrastructure privatization in developing countries.
33The estimations on which these Granger-causality tests are based are available from
the authors upon request.
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This table shows that the telecommunications reforms Granger-cause
fixed-line deployment except when using the variable of competition in the
fixed-line local segment as the reform variable. Examining the reverse causal-
ity, we find some evidence of one that runs from the fixed-line deployment
variable to the telecommunications reforms variables although weaker. More
specifically, the fixed-line deployment variable causes the variable of com-
petition in the digital cellular segment, the variable of competition in the
fixed-line local segment, and the variable that indicates the creation of a sep-
arate regulator. However, we do not find any empirical evidence that would
suggest that the fixed-line deployment variable causes the variable of com-
petition in the analogue cellular segment and the variable of privatization.
In addition to bringing some empirical evidence on the existence of causal
relationships between reforms and infrastructure deployment variables, these
Granger tests provide us with invaluable information on the dynamics of these
relationships when they are found to exist. In the end, these tests allow us
to select potential variables, and their precise lag structure, to be included as
regressors in the regressions that are used to model the relationship between
reforms and network deployment.34
5.3 The determinants of reforms: Empirical analysis
We now make use of regression analysis to investigate the determinants of
the telecommunications reforms. We first consider the econometric specifica-
tions with a discrete reform dependent variable which are used to model the
introduction of competition in the cellular (analogue and digital) and fixed-
line (local) markets, and the creation of a separate regulator. These models
are estimated using CLOGLOG and FIML when exogeneity turns out to be
rejected. Then, we consider the specification with a continuous reform de-
pendent variable which is used to model the privatization reform. This model
is estimated using SYS-GMM and possible endogeneity of some regressors is
accounted for. In both types of specifications, the main regressors are drawn
from the set of variables that have “passed” the causality tests discussed in
section 5.2 and so as to permit the testing of the hypotheses discussed in
section 5.1.
34Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), we use variables lagged one, two, and three
periods in the Granger causality tests.
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5.3.1 Regressions with a discrete reform dependent variable
Tables 2 through 5 below display the estimation results obtained by apply-
ing the grouped duration (robust cluster) methodology to the regressions
with, respectively, the variable competition in the analogue cellular segment
(acit), competition in the digital cellular segment (dcit), competition in the
fixed-line local segment (lcit), and creation of a separate regulator (rit) as
the dependent variable.35,36 When the CLOGLOG technique is applied (see
the columns with the heading “CLOGLOG” in the tables), these tables show
the parameter estimates corresponding to the indicated explanatory variables
without and with temporal dummies, the value of the log of the pseudo-
likelihood, “Log-likelihood,” a likelihood ratio statistic for testing the valid-
ity of the temporal dummies, “Temporal dummies LR,” and the number of
observations actually used in the estimation, “Obs.”37
In the cases where endogeneity problems arise, the FIML, or more specifi-
cally the 2SCML, estimation methodology is applied. We indicate the instru-
ments that have been excluded in the first-stage, “Instruments,” the squared
partial correlation coefficient between the excluded instruments and the en-
dogenous variable, “Partial R2,” the value of the F statistic for testing the
joint significance of the instruments excluded in the first stage regression,
“F,” the Sargan statistic for testing the validity of the excluded instruments,
“Sargan,” the squared correlation coefficient between observed and fitted
first-stage values of the dependent variable, “R2OLS,” the estimated correla-
tion coefficient between the disturbances of the first and second stage regres-
sions (ωit and ηit from equations (1) and (2)) that signals whether the tested
variable is endogenous, “Rho,” and the value of the subsequent exogeneity
test statistic, “Exogeneity.”38
35Note that this methodology is applied to the explanatory variables in first differences.
36A modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity under the null of homoskedas-
ticity is rejected at the 1% significance level in all the regressions presented in Tables 2-5.
Hence, standard errors are adjusted for intragroup correlation. The mean variance infla-
tor factor is also calculated in all the regressions with obtained values that remain always
under 3.
37In all the tables presented in this paper, we indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% confidence level by the subscripts, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ respectively.
38A value of an F statistic over 10 is typically sufficient for identification in the presence
of one endogenous regressor. A R2OLS of over 10% is also required for identification.
As to the Sargan test, we have adapted it to these discrete regressions. The validity
of instruments is given by a Wald test of the joint significance of a number of excluded
instruments in the first stage, where this number is found by subtracting the number of
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Let us first examine the CLOGLOG estimations of the models without
and with temporal dummies exhibited in Tables 2-5. Comparing these two
types of models, we see from the values of the Temporal dummies LR statistic
displayed in these tables that temporal independence is rejected in the models
of competition in the digital cellular segment and creation of a separate
regulator.39 We therefore conclude that while the time elapsed between a
given reform and the previous one or the beginning of the sample influences
the outcome in the case of the introduction of competition in the digital
cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator, it doesn’t in the
cases of the introduction of competition in the analogue cellular and fixed-line
local segments.
Regarding the presence of multiple events in the series describing the in-
troduction of competition in the analogue and digital cellular segments indi-
cated by the variables counter ana and counter dig respectively, we obtain
the following results. In Table 2, the regressor counter ana has a signifi-
cant negative impact on the variable competition in the analogue cellular
segment. In Table 3, however, the regressor counter dig does not have a
significant impact on the variable competition in the digital cellular segment
once temporal dependence is corrected for (see Model E). Hence, the number
and frequency of licences previously granted in the analogue cellular segment
has a negative impact on the decision to grant a license, that is, second and
subsequent licences are not issued independently of the first one.40 In con-
trast, the structuration of previous licenses does not appear as having an
effect on the decision to grant a license in the digital cellular segment.
Now, since some explanatory variables in these regressions with a discrete
dependent variable may potentially be endogenous, we perform an exogeneity
test by applying the 2SCML (cluster-robust) technique to the best of the two
models, the one without temporal dummies and the one with. In fact, the
best model is the one without dummies if temporal dependence is rejected
and the one with temporal dummies if it isn’t. From Tables 2-5, we see that
the final modeling choices for the dependent variables are Model A for ac
endogenous regressors from the number of excluded instruments.
39This LR statistic is indeed significant in Tables 3 and 5.
40This is consistent with the fact that in the period under study many countries main-
tained a monopoly in the analogue cellular segment with the unique licence often owned
by the fixed-line incumbent.
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and Model H for lc, both of these models without temporal dependence, and
Model E for dc and Model L for r, both with temporal dependence.
Tables A1-A4 given in appendix report the results of these exogeneity
tests performed on each of the potentially endogenous variables separately
and then jointly. In addition to containing some items already described for
Tables 2-5 above, these tables include a Shea’s square partial correlation that
takes into account the inter-correlation among instruments when more than
one variable is being tested at a time, “Shea’s partial R2.”41 Exogeneity is
rejected in three cases.42 In Table A2, the fixed-line deployment variable
(∆ log(mlit−1)) is endogenous to the variable of competition in the digital
cellular segment according to both the individual test (at the 10% level)
and the joint test (at the 5% level). In Table A3, the corruption variable
(∆corruptionit) is endogenous to the variable of competition in the fixed-line
local segment when tested both separately (at the 10% level) and jointly (at
the 1% level). Finally, in Table A4, the institutional index (∆institutionalit)
is endogenous to the decision of creating a separate regulator when test both
separately (at the 10% level) and jointly (at the 5% level).
For these cases where exogeneity is rejected, the FIML estimation re-
sults are also reported in Tables 3-5 and kept for the subsequent regressions
in which alternative explanatory variables are added.43 We observe that the
correlation coefficient Rho and the Exogeneity statistic found with the FIML
technique confirm the 2SCML results rejecting the exogeneity of the instru-
mented variables.44 In the regressions corresponding to the variable of com-
petition in the digital cellular segment (see Table 3), we see that the variable
41The Shea’s Partial R2 is more informative than the Partial R2 in the presence of
multiple potentially endogenous regressors. In such a context, a large partial R2 and a
small Shea’s partial R2 are interpreted as indicating that the model is not identified.
42The Sargan statistic confirms the validity of instruments. In addition, there is no
problem of identification as is shown by an F statistic always superior to 10 in at least
one of the proposed testing configurations (separate or joint testing of the endogenous
regressors). The Shea Partial R2 is severely downsized as compared to the Partial R2
only in the joint exogeneity test performed in Table A4. Nevertheless, this joint test is
consistent with the results of the individual tests shown in the same table.
43The CLOGLOG model is kept only in the case of competition in the analogue cellu-
lar segment where we didn’t find evidence of endogeneity. The reported estimates with
CLOGLOG and FIML cannot be directly compared as they are subject to different scaling.
44The R2OLS signals sufficient identification with values superior or close to 10%. The
negative correlation in Rho in Tables 3 and 5 signals the downward bias in the endogenous
variable, which can be seen by comparing Models E and F, and L and M, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, the positive correlation in Rho in Table 4 signals an upward bias in the endogenous
variable (see Models I and J).
22
of fixed-line deployment (∆mlit−1) becomes significant at the 1% level once
instrumented in Models F and G.45 In the regressions of the variable com-
petition in the fixed local segment (see Table 4), the variable of corruption
(∆corruptionit) changes from a positive and significant effect in Model H to
a negative and significant effect once this variable is instrumented in Model
J.46 Finally, in the regressions that seek to explain the decision to create a
separate regulator (see Table 5), the institutional index (∆institutionalit)
changes from having a non significant effect in Model L to a positive and
significant effect at the 5% level once this variable is instrumented in Model
M.47
We now turn to the empirical evidence concerning the hypotheses on the
determinants of reforms discussed in section 5.1. Hypothesis 1 regarding the
role of corruption is only partially confirmed by our estimation results. We
do find some empirical support to it since the variable corruption is incor-
porated in the institutional index (∆institutionalit) and the latter, as can
be seen from Table 2, has a positive and significant impact on the decision
to introduce competition in the analogue cellular segment (see the results
on Models A and C).48 However, in Tables 3 and 4 explaining the decisions
to introduce competition in the digital cellular and the fixed-line segments
respectively, the institutional index, the corruption variable (∆corruptionit),
and the democracy variable (∆democracyit) all have a negative and signifi-
cant impact (see the results on Models F, G, and J).
What about the role of the cost of public funds in the decision to in-
troduce competition? Hypothesis 2 says that a higher cost of public funds
should discourage the introduction of competition. Our empirical analysis
although supportive of this hypothesis are somewhat mitigated. The results
concerning the decision to introduce competition in the analogue cellular and
fixed segments support this hypothesis. Indeed, from Table 2 we see that aid
45A “hat” above a variable indicates that this variable has been instrumented.
46The level of democracy (∆democracyit) and the total debt service (∆debtit−2) loose
their significance in Model J and the population density (∆densityit) becomes significant
at the 5% level.
47The checks and balances variable (∆checksit) looses significance in Model M and the
mainline penetration (∆mlit−2) and population density (∆densityit) variables become
significant at respectively the 10% and 5% levels.
48Recall that increasing values of the variable corruption indicates lower corruption in
the government.
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per capita (∆aidit−2 in Models A and B) and net taxes on products (∆taxit−3
in Model C) have a positive and significant impact on competition.49 More-
over, from Table 4 we see that net taxes on products (∆taxit−2 in Model J)
has also a positive and significant impact on the decision to introduce com-
petition in the fixed-line local segment. In contrast, the results concerning
the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment contra-
dict Hypothesis 2. We indeed see from Table 3 that the total debt service
(∆debtit−2 in Model F) has a positive and significant impact on this deci-
sion and aid per capita (∆aidit−3 in Model G) has a negative and significant
impact.
We conclude this section by examining the empirical evidence on the
role of government commitment, the discount factor, and the returns on
investment in the decision to create a separate regulator. Hypothesis 3 states
that countries where government commitment is weak, returns on investment
are large, and the discount factor is high are likely to establish a separate
regulatory authority.50 Our results do not seem to confirm the whole claim of
this hypothesis. First, assuming that government commitment is reasonably
well captured in the institutional index, we see from Model M in Table 5
that it has rather a positive and significant impact on the decision to create
a separate regulator (see Model M). Second, assuming that the discount
factor is reflected in the variable checks and balances (∆checksit), we see
from the same table that it is not significant once endogeneity problems have
been alleviated in Model M. Finally, assuming that the return on investment
is well proxied by the variable deployment of fixed lines (∆mlit−2), we see
from the same model M that it has a positive and significant effect on the
decision to create a separate regulator, a result that supports the third part
of Hypothesis 3.
49Recall that the trust is that there exists a positive (negative) relationship between the
cost of public funds and the total debt service (net taxes and aid per capita). In practice,
we use these related variables lagged two and three periods and report the coefficients of
these lagged variables that are actually significant.
50We should emphasize here that when we stated Hypothesis 3 (see section 5.1), we
abstracted away from the debate of independence vs. autonomy of the regulator, although
we believe that the issue has its own importance.
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Table 2
Cellular competition (analogue) parameter estimates
Model A Model B Model C
cloglog cloglog cloglog
acit w/dummies
∆institutionalit 0.168∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
∆democracyit 0.182 0.122 0.174
∆debtit−2 -0.011 -0.010
∆taxit−2 0.063 0.047
∆aidit−2 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
∆debtit−3 0.003
∆taxit−3 0.113∗∗
∆aidit−3 0.001
∆ruralit 0.321 0.345 0.324
∆densityit -0.026 -0.023 -0.021
counter anait -0.435∗∗ -0.671∗∗ -0.520∗∗
Log-likelihood -176.86 -169.64 -167.85
Temporal dummies LR 16.43
Obs 643 643 586
Table 3
Cellular competition (digital) parameter estimates
Model D Model E Model F Model G
cloglog cloglog fiml fiml
dcit w/dummies w/dummies w/dummies
∆institutionalit -0.292∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
∆democracyit -0.240∗∗ -0.115 -0.131∗ -0.054
∆debtit−2 0.048∗∗∗ 0.033* 0.026∗∗
∆taxit−2 -0.017 -0.034 -0.011
∆aidit−2 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001
∆debtit−3 0.005
∆taxit−3 -0.013
∆aidit−3 -0.007∗
∆ruralit -0.087 -0.284 -0.316∗ -0.286
∆densityit 0.040∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.021 0.031∗
∆mlit−1 0.682 0.187
∆̂mlit−1 2.846∗∗∗ 2.643∗∗∗
counter digit 0.369∗∗ 0.105 -0.233 -0.398
Log-likelihood -207.39 -183.38 -87.73 -92.58
Temporal dummies LR 48.02∗∗∗
Instruments ethnicit polconit school80i polconit
Partial R2 0.098 0.075
F 16.62 9.19
Sargan 0.00 0.03
R2OLS 0.199 0.155
Rho -0.684 -0.573
Exogeneity 11.77∗∗∗ 6.44∗∗
Obs 667 667 664 466
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Table 4
Fixed-line competition (local) parameter estimates
Model H Model I Model J
cloglog cloglog fiml
lcit w/dummies
∆corruptionit 1.510∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗
̂∆corruptionit -1.867∗∗
∆democracyit -0.266* -0.317∗∗ -0.055
∆debtit−2 0.043∗∗∗ 0.029* 0.007
∆taxit−2 0.165∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.056∗
∆aidit−2 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
∆ruralit 0.245 0.255 0.121
∆densityit 0.076 0.079 0.054**
∆mlit−1 11.821∗∗∗ 10.194∗∗∗ 4.882∗∗∗
Log-likelihood -63.29 -59.55 -41.80
Temporal dummies LR 7.47
Instruments ∆ruleit africai
Partial R2 0.064
F 14.69
Sargan 1.11
R2OLS 0.095
Rho 0.642
Exogeneity 8.75∗∗∗
Obs 667 667 667
Table 5
Separate regulator parameter estimates
Model K Model L Model M
cloglog cloglog fiml
rit w/dummies w/dummies
∆institutionalit -0.106 -0.131
̂∆institutionalit 0.296∗∗
∆democracyit -0.256 -0.227 -0.061
∆checksit 0.221∗ 0.181∗ 0.048
∆importit 0.059∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
∆staffit -1.890∗ -3.047∗ 0.762
∆ruralit 0.202 0.365 0.083
∆densityit -0.047 -0.077 -0.063∗∗
∆mlit−2 -1.835 -3.615 -2.197∗
Log-likelihood -130.68 -106.31 -1485.61
Temporal dummies LR 47.94∗∗∗
Instruments protest80i africai
Partial R2 0.032
F 12.50
Sargan 1.32
R2OLS 0.126
Rho -0.657
Exogeneity 4.24∗∗
Obs 688 633 688
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5.3.2 Regression with a continuous reform dependent variable
Tables 6 shows the SYS-GMM (one-step robust) estimation results of the
regressions with the variable privatization as the dependent variable and
the coefficient shown corresponding to regressors in first-differences. This
table also exhibits the first and n-th order autocorrelation coefficients of the
residuals in first differences,m1 andmn, the value of the J statistic for testing
the validity of the instruments, the value of the Dif-Sargan statistic that
allows to test the validity of the additional SYS-GMM conditions, the value
of the starting lag of the instruments, L, a Wald statistic for testing the joint
significance of the temporal dummies, Temporal dummies, the F statistic for
testing the joint significance of the explanatory variables, Goodness-of-fit,
and the number of observations actually used.51
From this table, it appears that in all the estimations but that of Model
P, second-order autocorrelation of the residuals in first differences (m2) is
rejected using as instruments the initial lag of two and more periods for the
variables in levels and one period for the variable in first differences. This
confirms the validity of these instruments. In the case of Model P, we find
empirical evidence that the disturbance term in levels follows a MA(2). The
valid instruments then are the variables in levels lagged 4 and more periods
for the equation in first differences and the variables in differences lagged
3 periods for the equation in levels. Moreover, the J test never rejects the
validity of the instruments.52 We also see that the Dif-Sargan test accepts
the additional moment conditions required to use the SYS-GMM.
Time specific effects and endogeneity of regressors deserve some attention
here.53 The presence of time specific effects is tested and rejected in the
51Even if two-step GMM is known to be asymptotically more efficient than one-step
GMM, we omit the two-step GMM estimates as we find that their asymptotic standard er-
rors tend to be abnormally small even when we make the finite sample correction proposed
by Windmeijer (2000). In fact, Arellano and Bond (1991) show by means of simulations
that this apparent gain in precision may reflect a downward finite-sample bias. In addi-
tion, in all the SYS-GMM tables in this paper, the Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg test
always rejects the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity. Moreover, the mean variance
inflator factor remains always under 5.
52A rejection with such a J test may turn out to be a consequence of measurement
errors (Blundell and Bond, 1999).
53That endogeneity is a relevant issue in our context has been already discussed. As to
time specific effects, their investigation is justified by the occurrence of some important
events during the period under study including the 1995 “Tequila” crisis, the 1997 South-
Asian crisis, the 1998-1999 financial breakdown, and the introduction of digital systems.
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regression explaining privatization. Hence, time dummies are not included
in this regression.54 Endogeneity of regressors is checked using the goodness-
of-fit criterion. In the privatization regression, only the best model (with no
endogenous regressors, except for ∆pit−1) is reported in Table 6.
Table 6
Privatization parameter estimates
Model N Model O Model P Model Q Model R
sys-gmm sys-gmm sys-gmm sys-gmm sys-gmm
∆pit w/dummies
∆̂pit−1 0.018 0.006 0.113 0.022 0.014
∆riskit 0.010∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗
∆institutionalit -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
∆institutional2it 0.001
∗∗ 0.001∗
∆democracyit 0.188∗ 0.135 0.032
∆democracy2it -0.016 -0.013 -0.002
∆debtit−2 0.001∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001
∆taxit−2 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003∗
∆aidit−2 -0.001∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗
∆debtit−3 0.001∗∗ -0.000
∆taxit−3 0.001 0.003
∆aidit−3 -0.001∗ 0.000
∆ruralit 0.073 0.083 0.004 0.048 0.045
∆densityit -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
m1 -3.84∗∗∗ -3.82∗∗∗ -2.93∗∗∗ -3.52∗∗∗ -3.42∗∗∗
m2 0.59 0.03 1.08 1.09
m4 -1.73∗
J 5.54 7.85 2.59 10.18 9.15
Dif-Sargan 0.37 1.37 -0.99 0.60 3.82
L 2 2 4 2 2
Temporal dummies 1.38
Goodness-of-fit 6.88∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗ 5.71∗∗∗
Obs. 667 667 620 672 613
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L− 1) for the equation in first diffe-
rences and levels, respectively.
What are the implications of our empirical results as to the validity of
Hypothesis 4 which says that countries with little or extreme corruption in
the government should privatize less? We find that when corruption is prox-
ied by the democracy index, it has a negative impact on the privatization
decision in Model N, which is not consistent with the hypothesis. Interest-
ingly enough though, thinking of Hypothesis 4 as saying that corruption has
a decreasing marginal impact on privatization, we see that it is confirmed.
54The variable Temporal dummies is not significant in Model O (Table 6). The
Goodness-of-fit test also rejects the presence of time specific effects in Table 6.
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Indeed, from Table 6, we see that the institutional index which, recall, in-
corporates the corruption level, has a positive impact on the privatization
decision and the square of this index has a negative impact in Models Q and
R.
Regarding the hypotheses on the determinants of privatization, Hypoth-
esis 5 says that high costs of public funds and high risks are associated with
low privatization. This hypothesis is partially confirmed by our empirical
results. The current increase rate of the risk index (∆riskit) has a significant
impact on the privatization decision across all Models in Table 6, which is
consistent with the hypothesis.55 However, the cost of public funds has a
positive impact on the decision of privatizing, which is not consistent with
the hypothesis. We find that, in growth rates, the lagged (two and three
periods) total debt service (∆debtit−2, ∆debtit−3) has a positive impact on
privatization in Models N, O, and P, the lagged (two and three periods) aid
per capita (∆aidit−2 and ∆aidit−3) has a negative impact in Models N, O,
and P, and the lagged (two periods) net taxes on products (∆taxit−2) has a
negative impact in Model Q.
5.4 The simultaneous relationship between the reforms
and the fixed network development
In this section, we discuss the implications of our results as far as the si-
multaneous relationship between the telecommunications reforms and the
deployment of the fixed-line network is concerned. We first put together the
empirical elements that will allow us to build this relationship.
Starting with the impact of the development of fixed service on the re-
forms, we have included, following the results of the causality tests synthe-
sized in Table 1, the variable fixed-line deployment to explain the decisions
to introduce competition in the digital cellular and the fixed-line local seg-
ments, and the decision to create a separate regulator. The specific effects
obtained are as follows. The growth of the lagged (one period) fixed ser-
vice penetration rate (∆mlit−1) affects positively the decision to introduce
competition in the digital cellular segment (see Models F and G in Table 3)
and in the fixed local segment (see Models H and J in Table 4). As to the
55Recall that higher values of the risk index (risk) correspond to lower risk.
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decision to create a separate regulator, it is found (see Model M in Table 5)
to be negatively affected by the growth of lagged (two periods) fixed service
penetration rate (∆mlit−2).
Let us now consider the impact of the telecommunications reforms on
the deployment of fixed lines. Table 7 displays the results of the regression
to look at. This table has the same structure as Table 6 presented in the
previous section and, as done earlier, we have made the choice of regressors
on the basis of the results of the causality tests discussed in section 5.2.56 We
observe that all the reforms variables have been included as regressors except
the one used to represent the introduction of competition in the fixed-line
local segment.57 We find that competition in the analogue cellular segment
(∆acit−1) has a negative impact on the fixed-line deployment in Models S, T,
and U whereas competition in the digital cellular segment (∆dcit−1, ∆dcit−2)
has a positive impact in Model S and even when endogeneity is controlled for
in Model U (∆dcit−2). As to the other reform variables, we see that while the
creation of a separate regulator (∆rit−2) has a positive impact in Model S,
once endogeneity is taken into account in Model U, the associated coefficient
is no longer significant. Finally, privatization (∆privait−1, ∆privait−2) has
positive effect on the fixed service segment in Model S and this impact re-
mains significant (∆privait−1) when endogeneity of some regressors is taken
into account in Model U.
The results discussed so far indicate that there exists a simultaneous
relationship between the introduction of competition in the digital cellular
segment and the development of the fixed-line segment. More specifically, our
data analysis has shown that higher penetration rates in the fixed segment
have been an important determinant of the decision to introduce competition
in the digital cellular segment and, in turn, competition in this sector has
resulted in higher penetration rates. Table 8 below summarizes the quantita-
tive relationships found between the various reform policies considered in this
56In this table, we report the best model (with the endogenous regressors) in Model
U, and, for the purpose of making comparisons, the second best (with no endogenous
regressors) in Model S. In particular, Model S includes as endogenous the regressors when
a two-way causal relationship, that is, the variables competition in the digital cellular
segment and creation of a separate regulator.
57The lack of causality between the introduction of competition and the deployment of
service in the fixed service segment is not surprising as it is well known that this market
has experiencing heavy business stealing.
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paper and fixed-line deployment.58 In addition to showing the simultaneous
relationship between digital cellular competition and fixed service deploy-
ment, this table includes the results on the other relationships considered
that are worth discussing.
If we examine the role played by fixed-line deployment in the reform
decision-making process, we find evidence that the lower the fixed-line pene-
tration rate, the more likely a separate regulator will be created and the less
competition is introduced in the digital cellular and fixed local segments. A
possible explanation of these results is that poorly performing fixed service
sectors have called for the creation of a separate regulator to bring reme-
dies while well performing fixed sectors have resulted in the introduction of
competition in the digital cellular and fixed segments since those entail high
licence fees. Let us now turn to an examination of the impact of the reforms
on the deployment of fixed infrastructure.
Consider first the results concerning the role of competition. As discussed
in the beginning of this section, we have found a positive impact of the
introduction of competition in the digital cellular segment. In contrast, we
have found that the introduction of competition in the analogue cellular
segment has a negative impact.59 These results demand two remarks. First,
the fact that we treated separately has indeed proven to be necessary.60
Second, these results suggest that fixed service and digital cellular service
are complements while fixed service and analogue cellular service seem to be
complements.61
What about the two other important reform policies, namely, privatiza-
tion and the creation of a separate regulator? Our work sheds some light on
the issue of the impact of privatization which is not settled in the literature.
58Table 8 is basically Table 1 where the causal relationships found are given the quan-
titative form resulting from the regression analysis.
59As mentioned earlier, competition in the fixed local segment has not been found to
have a significant impact on network expansion.
60Recall that the usual practice is to unify these two segments by using an aggregate
index of competition in the cellular sector and that the empirical findings have been almost
systematically a positive impact on the fixed sector (see section 2).
61This implication assumes that competition typically fosters service usage. It is con-
sistent with the fact that analogue licences have appeared before digital licences and have
been mostly granted to the incumbent, in which case no strong competition between fixed
service and analogue cellular service can be expected. Moreover, capacity constraints as-
sociated with the analogue technology have typically limited the number of issued licences
in the analogue cellular segment.
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We find strong evidence in our data set that privatization has a strong pos-
itive impact on the fixed service penetration rate. As to the creation of a
separate regulator, the data does not seem to show that it has a significant
impact on fixed-line deployment.
Table 7
Fixed-line deployment parameter estimates
Model S Model T Model U
sys-gmm sys-gmm sys-gmm
∆log(mlit) w/dummies
̂∆log(mlit−1) 0.558∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
∆pit−1 0.107∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.099∗
∆pit−2 0.067∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.068
∆acit−1 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
∆dcit−1 0.031∗∗ 0.025
∆dcit−2 0.011∗∗ 0.007
∆̂dcit−1 0.001
∆̂dcit−2 0.019∗
∆rit−2 0.023* 0.024∗
∆̂rit−2 0.042
∆institutionalit 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.002∗∗
∆democracyit 0.007 0.010 0.004
∆ruralit -0.006 -0.012 -0.001
∆densityit -0.006 -0.006 -0.002
m1 -4.93∗∗∗ -4.88∗∗∗ -4.99∗∗∗
m2 0.40 0.50 0.76
J 55.04 46.88 57.88
Dif-Sargan -3.33 -2.63 -3.01
L 2 2 2
Temporal dummies 1.48
Goodness-of-fit 17.71∗∗∗ 17.43∗∗∗ 20.41∗∗∗
Obs. 775 775 775
Notes: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L− 1) for the
equation in first differences and levels, respectively.
Table 8
Summary of results: Relationship
between reforms and fixed-line deployment
ac dc lc r p
reform → fixed-line deployment - + na ns +
fixed-line deployment → reform na + + - na
Note: na and ns stand for not applicable and not significant, res-
pectively.
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5.5 The determinant of the reforms: Summary
Table 9 below summarizes the results of our econometric analysis of the
determinants of the telecommunications reform policies. We can see from
this table that the initial performance of the sector, the institutional envi-
ronment, and the cost of public funds play an important role in the reform
decisions. Let us examine the three main reforms, competition, privatization,
and creation of a separate regulator, in turn.
Table 9
Summary of results: Determinants of reforms
ac dc lc r p
risk index
risk na na na na +
cost of public funds
total debt service ns + ns na +
net taxes on products + ns + na -
aid per capita + - ns na -
aggregated - + - na +
institutional environment indices
corruption ns ns - ns ns
institutional index + - ns + -
democracy index ns - ns ns +
institutional index (square) na na na na +
democracy index (square) na na na na ns
discount factor
checks and balances na na na ns na
returns on investment
fixed-line deployment na + + - na
Note: na and ns stand for not applicable and not significant respectively.
We have already discussed the positive impact of fixed service penetration
rates on the decision to introduce competition in both the digital cellular and
fixed local markets. But, besides fixed service penetration rates what else has
a significant impact on the introduction of competition in the telecommunica-
tions industry? We find that that the weaker the institutional environment,
the less likely to find competition in the analogue cellular market and the
more likely to find competition in the digital cellular and fixed local markets.
The conduct of competition policy is also found to be markedly influenced by
a country’s financial situation. Our data analysis has shown that the higher
the cost of public funds, the more likely to find competition in the digital
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cellular market and the less likely to find competition in the analogue cellular
and fixed service markets.
As to the privatization of the fixed service incumbent, we find that the
likelihood that it takes place is positively affected by a deterioration of the
institutional environment and negatively by a higher country risk, and pos-
itively affected by a higher cost of public funds.62 Finally, concerning the
decision to create a separate regulatory authority, we find that a well per-
forming fixed service sector (higher penetration rates) affects this decision
negatively whereas a better institutional environment affects it positively.
6 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the importance of the institutional and macroe-
conomic features of developing countries in understanding the evolution of
their telecommunications industry over the past two decades. To show this
point, we have set an empirical strategy seeking to econometrically identify
the key determinants of the three main policy initiatives that have been at
the heart of the reforms of the telecommunications industry, namely, com-
petition, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. To give more
robustness to our argument, from both a technical (taking care of causality
and endogeneity issues) and a policy (accounting for the rational of the re-
forms) viewpoint, we have also investigated the extent to which these policies
have translated into actual deployment of telecommunications infrastructure.
Our econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 time-series-cross-sectional database
on 86 developing countries indeed finds that sectoral but also institutional
and financial factors are important determinants of the actual reforms im-
plemented in these countries.
Concerning the sectoral effects, our separate treatment of the analogue
and digital cellular technologies allowed us to obtain some more disaggregated
results than those obtained in the literature in which these two segments have
typically been merged.63 We have uncovered a positive relationship between
62In a country under high risk rating, the government anticipates that the incumbent
will be sold at a discounted price and thus decides not to privatize.
63Capacity constraints associated with the analogue technology are among the major
reasons why digital technology is relatively more appealing for the rapidly increasing cel-
lular market. Indeed, digital technology allows to allocate more users within the same
coverage area and more information can be simultaneously sent and received by each
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the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and
the growth of the fixed-line segment, whereas a negative relationship was
found between the decision to introduce competition in the analogue cellular
segment and the growth of the fixed-line segment. These results reveal that
the positive effect of competition in the cellular segment on the fixed segment
reported in the literature is in fact mainly due to competition in the digital
cellular segment. Analogue cellular appears therefore as a substitute to the
fixed service whereas digital cellular appears as a complement. The data
analysis has indeed shown that the digital cellular and fixed markets have
benefited from each other.
As to the institutional and country risk effects, we find that countries
facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely
to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the
fixed-line incumbent. In turn, these policies are those that were found to
enhance the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure.64 In contrast, competi-
tion in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator
are found to be less likely to be introduced in countries facing increasing
institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact on fixed network
deployment is found to be negative or non significant.
How should one interpret our results that highlight the importance of the
quality of the institutional environment and the state of the government’s
finances in the determination of the implemented reforms? Developing coun-
tries with higher institutional risk and tighter financial constraints are more
likely to promote policies, such as allowing entry into the digital cellular
segment and privatizing the fixed-line incumbent, that attract a larger num-
ber of investors whose rents can be extracted through the licence fees, red
tape, or else.65 By the same token, these countries are less supportive of
phone user. Moreover, while analogue technology does not allow for wireless data ser-
vices, digital technology includes voice mail, caller identification, call waiting, access to
internet, and short message system (SMS). In addition, digital technology is more prone
than analogue technology to interference and has better privacy and security attributes.
A drawback of the digital technology, however, is that, unlike the analogue technology,
there is no unified system and roaming between systems can be expensive.
64Our results on the positive impact of privatization on fixed-line deployment is in
contrast with the null or negative impact found in the literature. This might be due to the
fact that most empirical studies have aggregated data on countries with different levels of
development. Separating data according to GDP, Gasmi et al (2006) find a positive impact
in data on developing countries and a negative impact in data on developed countries.
65One can take the view that governments promote these reforms in order to circum-
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those reforms that are likely to provide them with less cash, such as cellular
competition in the analogue segment and the creation of a regulator. Ex-
cept in extreme cases of high corruption, the economically profitable reforms
promoted by the governments are those that are likely to be successful, in
particular, those that are expected to have a significant positive impact on
the telecommunications infrastructure.66 This argument may partly explain
the impressive growth of telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent
years.
vent institutional and economic country weaknesses. Nevertheless, this would imply that
governments can anticipate which policies will deliver better outcomes in terms of service
deployment.
66In this paper, we have discussed the positive impact of competition in the digital
cellular segment and privatization on fixed-line deployment, but we did find evidence of
a (standard) positive impact on cellular subscription as well and the results are available
from the authors upon request.
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Appendix
• Data
The data set constructed for this study contains observations for the
period 1985-1999 on the following list of 86 developing countries:
- Asia and Pacific: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet-
nam.
- Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe.
- Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and United Arab
Emirates.
- Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bahamas, Barba-
dos, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
We have collected data on variables regrouped in five categories: “Telecom-
munications deployment,” “Telecommunications reforms,” “Institutional
environment and risk indices,” “Cost of public funds,” and “Other vari-
ables and instruments.” The definition of these variables and the data
sources are given below.
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Telecommunications deployment
Variable Source(s)
• Fixed-line deployment ITU
Telecommunications reforms
Variable Source(s)
Competition
• Cellular competition (analogue) -Various authors (Ros, 1999,
Bortolotti et al., 2001, McNary,
2001, Fink et al., 2002, Ros,
2003, and Li and Xu, 2004.).
-ITU World Telecommunications
Regulatory database.
-Operators and regulators web-
sites.
-Clark et al. (2004).
-http://www.gsmworld.com.
• Counter (analogue) -Idem
• Cellular competition (digital) -Idem
• Counter (digital) -Idem
• Fixed-line competition (local) -Idem
Separate regulator
• Separate regulator -Various authors (Bortolotti et
al., 2001, Fink et al, 2002,
Gutierrez, 2003, and Ros, 2003).
-ITU World Telecommunications
Regulatory database.
-Clark et al. (2004).
Privatization of the fixed-line incumbent
• Privatization -Various authors (Ros, 1999,
Bortolotti et al., 2001, McNary,
2001, Fink et al., 2002, Ros,
2003, and Li and Xu, 2004).
-ITU World Telecommunications
Regulatory database.
-Operators and regulators web-
sites.
-Clark et al. (2004).
-Private Privatization in Infras-
tructure (PPI) Project World
Bank database.
-IPANeT Privatization Transac-
tions database (World Bank).
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Institutional environment and risk indices
Variable Source(s)
Institutional environment indices
• Corruption -IRIS data set, University of Maryland (1982-1997).
• Institutional index -Idem• Democracy index -Polity IV project: Political Regime Characteristics
and Transitions, 1800-2002, Jaggers and Marshall
(2002).
Risk index
• Risk -International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) annual
ratings (1985-1999).
Cost of public funds
Variable Source(s)
• Total debt service -World development indicators 2004.
• Net taxes on products -Idem
• Aid per capita -Idem
Other variables and instruments
Variable Source(s)
Other variables
• Population density -World development indicators 2004.
• Rural population -World development indicators 2004.
• Imports -Idem
• Telecommunications staff -ITU
-World development indicators 2004.
• Checks and balances -DPI2000 Database of Political Institu-
tions 1975-2000, The World Bank.
Instruments
• English legal origin -La Porta et al. (1998).
• French legal origin -Idem
• Share of protestant (1980) -La Porta et al. (1998).
• Latitude -Idem• Average schooling years (1980) -Barro and Lee (1996).
• Ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion
-Policy Research Department, The
World Bank (Based on Atlas Naro-
dov Mira, 1964, Muller, 1964, Roberts,
1962, Gunnemark, 1991).
• Africa -World development indicators 2004.
• Crop and forest land -Idem
• Political constraints -Polconv 2002, from Henisz (2002).
• Free press -Freedom House Annual Survey of
Press Freedom, rankings 1980-2004.
• Ethnic tensions -IRIS data set, University of Maryland
(1982-1997).
• Law and Order -Idem
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Telecommunications deployment
. Mainline penetration: Number of telephone lines per 100 inhabi-
tants that connect subscribers’ terminal equipment to the Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).
Telecommunications reforms
- Competition
. Cellular competition (analogue): Dichotomous variable that
takes on the value 1 in year t if one cellular analogue license or
more have been issued sometime in the year t, and 0 otherwise.
. Counter (analogue): Variable that takes on the value 0 in year
t if no analogue license has been issued in t−1 or earlier, 1 in
t if one license has been issued in t− 1 or earlier, 2 in t if two
licences have been issued in t− 1 or earlier, and 3 in t if three
or more licenses have been issued in t − 1 or earlier. Thus,
this variable counts the number of previous granted analogue
licenses.
. Cellular competition (digital): Dichotomous variable that takes
on the value 1 in year t if one cellular digital license or more
have been issued sometime in the year t, and 0 otherwise.
. Counter (digital): Variable that takes on the value 0 in year
t if no digital license has been issued in t− 1 or earlier, 1 in t
if one license has been issued in t − 1 or earlier, 2 in t if two
licences have been issued in t− 1 or earlier, and 3 in t if three
or more licenses have been issued in t − 1 and earlier. Thus,
this variable counts the number of previous granted digital
licenses.
. Fixed-line competition (local): Dichotomous variable that takes
on the value 1 in year t if one or more fixed (local) licenses
have been issued sometime in the year t, and 0 otherwise.
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- Separate regulator
. Separate regulator: Dichotomous variable that takes on the
value 1 in year t if the regulatory agency has been separated
from and is not directly controlled by a ministry or a utility
sometime in year t, and 0 otherwise.
- Privatization of the fixed-line incumbent
. Privatization: Variable that gives the % of the incumbent’s
assets sold to private investors.
Institutional environment and risk indices
- Institutional environment indices
. Corruption: Variable with values ranging from 0 to 6 and
meant to reflect the degree of corruption of the political sys-
tem. The higher the value of the variable, the less corrupt the
political system. The particular concern here is with actual or
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepo-
tism, job reservations, favors for favors, secret party funding,
and close ties between politicians and business.
. Institutional index: Variable whose value is found by sum-
ming the values of the five institutionalization variables: the
degree of corruption in the political system, the quality of bu-
reaucracy and its capacity to govern without drastic changes
in policies or interruption in services, law and order as a mea-
sure of the strength of the legal system and of the popular
observance of the law, the risk of expropriation of private
investments in terms of forced nationalization, and the risk
that the government modifies a contract in the form of re-
pudiation, postponement or scaling down. The values of this
institutional index are in the range 0-50. Higher values of this
index reflect a “better” overall institutional environment.
. Democracy index: Variable whose value is found by subtract-
ing an index of autocracy from an index of democracy. The
values of the variable are ranging from −10 to 10 and meant
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to reflect the political regime of a country. Higher values in-
dicate democracies, lower values autocratic regimes.
- Risk index
. Risk: Variable whose value is the average of the values of
three variables: economic, financial and institutional risks.
The values of this risk index are in the range 0-100. Higher
values of this index reflect low risk.
Cost of public funds
. Total debt service: Sum of principal repayments and interests
paid in foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt,
interests paid on short-term debt, and repayments to the FMI, as
a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI).
. Net taxes on products: Variable obtained by subtracting subsi-
dies to product taxes as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). Product taxes are those payable by producers that relate
to the production, sale, purchase or use of the goods and services.
Subsidies are grants made by the government to private and pub-
lic firms aiming, e.g., at enabling maintenance of prices of goods
and services below costs of production.
. Aid per capita: Variable in 2000 USD that includes both official
development assistance, i.e., grants and loans made on conces-
sional terms from official agencies and multilateral institutions,
and official aid, i.e., aid flows from donors. It is calculated by
dividing total aid by the midyear population estimate.
Other variables and instruments
- Other variables
. Population density: Midyear population, i.e., all residents re-
gardless of legal status or citizenship, divided by the land area
in square kilometers.
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. Rural population: Variable that indicates the percentage of
the total population that resides in rural areas.
. Imports: The value of all goods and other market services
received from the rest of the world as a percentage of GDP. It
includes the value of merchandize, freight, insurance, trans-
port, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such
as communication, construction, financial, business, personal,
and government services.
. Telecommunications staff: Full-time staff employed by telecom-
munication operators for the provision of public (fixed and
mobile) telecommunication services, as a percentage of total
population and multiplied by 1000.
. Checks and balances: Variable with values in the range 0-
18 meant to give some indication on the division of powers
in a country. Higher values of this variable reflect a “more
balanced division of power” and hence a “better” mode of
functioning of the political process.
- Instruments
. English legal origin: Dichotomous variable that takes on the
value 1 if the country has an English common law tradition,
and 0 otherwise.
. French legal origin: Dichotomous variable that takes on the
value 1 if the country has an French commercial code tradi-
tion, and 0 otherwise.
. Share of protestant (1980): Variable that identifies for the
year 1980 the percentage of the population that are protestant
within a country.
. Latitude: Variable that gives the absolute value of the latitude
of the country, scaled to take values between 0-1.
. Average schooling years (1980): Average schooling years in
the total population over 25 within a country in 1980.
. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Average value of five indices
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, with values ranging from
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0 to 1, where higher values denote higher levels of fractional-
ization.
. Africa: Dichotomous variables that takes on the value 1 if
the country belongs to the Sub-Saharan African region and,
0 otherwise.
. Crop and forest land: Variable that indicates the percentage
of land that can includes temporary crops, temporary mead-
ows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen
gardens, land temporarily fallow, and land under natural or
planted stands of trees, whether productive or not.
. Political constraints: Variable with values between 0 and 1
that measures the extend to which a change in the preferences
of any actor may lead to a change in government policy. The
higher the value, the less feasible a policy change.
. Free press: Variable with values between 0 and 100 that mea-
sures the legal environment for the media, the political pres-
sures that influence reporting, and the economic factors that
affect access to information. Higher values imply higher free-
dom in press.
. Ethnic tensions: Variable with values between 0 and 6 that
measures the degree of tension in a country attributable to
racial, nationality, or language divisions. Higher ratings are
given to countries where tensions are minimal, even though
such divisions may exist.
. Law and Order: Variable taking values between 0 and 6. The
“Law” part of this variable is used to assess the strength and
impartiality of the legal system (e.g., due to the existence
of a strong judiciary system). The “Order” part gives an
indication of the popular observance of the law (e.g., low crime
rate or law not routinely ignored as with illegal strikes without
effective sanctions). A higher value of this variable reflects a
“better” judiciary system.
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• Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics
Variable Designation Obs. Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
telecommunications deployment
ml Fixed-line deployment 1287 1.62 6.20 0.01 42.36
telecommunications reforms
ac Cellular competition (analogue) 1250 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00
counter ana Counter (analogue) 1260 0.00 0.69 0.00 3.00
dc Cellular competition (digital) 1290 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00
counter dig Counter (digital) 1290 0.00 0.42 0.00 3.00
lc Fixed-line competition (local) 1290 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00
r Separate regulator 1290 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00
p Privatization 1287 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00
institutional environment and risk indices
corruption Corruption 1062 3.00 1.08 0.00 6.00
institutional Institutional index 1062 27.51 7.37 7.10 43.00
democracy Democracy index 1182 -1.00 6.77 -10.00 10.00
risk Risk index 1075 57.00 12.13 13.04 81.94
cost of public funds
debt Total debt service 1153 5.19 6.23 0.00 107.36
tax Net taxes on products 1135 8.00 4.70 -6.63 26.5
aid Aid per capita 1280 35.95 69.14 -23.02 629.16
other variables and instruments
density Population density 1281 38.68 135.97 1.34 972.41
rural Rural population 1290 59.28 20.96 8.64 94.96
import Imports 1206 32.09 22.25 4.63 173.49
staff Telecommunications staff 1161 86.00 105.00 3.00 898.00
checks Checks and balances 1236 2.00 1.65 1.00 18.00
english English legal origin 1290 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
french French legal origin 1290 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
protest80 Share of protestant (1980) 1290 2.75 14.43 0.00 64.20
latitude Latitude 1290 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.38
school80 Average schooling years (1980) 780 2.95 1.65 0.39 6.84
ethno Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1245 0.43 0.31 0.00 0.89
africa Africa 1290 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
land Crop and forest land 1290 10.82 14.80 0.00 72.84
polcon Political constraints 1260 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.65
free press Free press 1284 55.50 22.28 7.00 99.00
ethnic Ethnic tensions 1062 4.00 1.44 0.00 6.00
rule Law and order 1062 3.00 1.23 0.00 6.00
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• Exogeneity tests for the reforms represented by a discrete
variable
The procedure used to perform the exogeneity tests with 2SCML is
the following. We first estimate equation (2) to construct a vector
of residuals for each of the potentially endogenous variables vit. We
then estimate equation (1) by including these constructed residuals
and keeping the actual values of the potentially endogenous regressors
as right-hand-side variables. If the constructed vector of residuals turns
out not to be significantly different from zero, this indicates that ωit
and ηit are not correlated and we conclude that the regressor vit is
exogenous.
Table A1
Cellular competition (analogue) exogeneity tests
MODEL A (acit) Potentially endogenous variables
∆debtit−2 ∆aidit−2 ∆institutionalit
Instruments rurali englishi protest80i landi frenchi ethnicit
Partial R2 0.052 0.064 0.327
F 21.86 27.99 123.42
Sargan 0.71 1.23 0.04
Exogeneity 2.44 1.27 0.01
Instruments landi englishi ruralit protest80i ethnicit
Partial R2 0.072 0.067 0.330
F 11.24 10.50 56.01
Shea Partial R2 0.031 0.027 0.217
Sargan 1.34
Exogeneity 1.16 0.11 0.21
Table A2
Cellular competition (digital) exogeneity tests
MODEL E (dcit) Potentially endogenous variables
∆debtit−2 ∆aidit−2 ∆institutionalit ∆logmlit−1
Instruments checksit ethnoi school80i africai
protest80i checksit ruralit−1 ruralit
Partial R2 0.045 0.094 0.085 0.663
F 13.57 31.34 40.59 714.90
Sargan 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.41
Exogeneity 0.12 0.06 0.10 3.23∗
Instruments englishi ruralit−1 checksit school80i free pressi ethnoi
Partial R2 0.103 0.150 0.265 0.824
F 3.81 20.90 23.92 558.91
Shea Partial R2 0.072 0.110 0.112 0.367
Sargan 0.24
Exogeneity 0.63 0.83 2.24 4.00∗∗
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Table A3
Fixed-line competition (local) exogeneity tests
MODEL H (lcit) Potentially endogenous variables
∆debtit−2 ∆aidit−2 ∆corruptionit ∆logmlit−1
Instruments ruralit school80i free pressit school80i
protest80i protest80i latitudei africai
Partial R2 0.041 0.064 0.075 0.582
F 17.36 28.88 19.55 406.79
Sargan 0.50 0.83 0.12 0.21
Exogeneity 0.00 0.11 2.90∗ 0.13
Instruments protest80it englishi ethnicit ethnoit school80i
latitudei checkit
Partial R2 0.147 0.148 0.209 0.769
F 6.44 16.38 12.25 400.26
Shea Partial R2 0.112 0.094 0.106 0.389
Sargan 3.77
Exogeneity 1.24 1.11 7.26∗∗∗ 1.85
Table A4
Separate regulator exogeneity tests
MODEL L (rit) Potentially endogenous variables
∆staffit ∆institutionalit ∆logmlit−2
Instruments latitudei englishi englishi ethnoit africai ethnoi
Partial R2 0.130 0.077 0.493
F 42.22 32.47 363.23
Sargan 1.31 0.31 0.38
Exogeneity 1.00 3.61∗ 0.05
Instruments ethnicit frenchi africai latitudei
Partial R2 0.347 0.237 0.543
F 105.13 283.89 86.62
Shea Partial R2 0.048 0.072 0.155
Sargan 0.87
Exogeneity 1.57 3.98∗∗ 0.02
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